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WHY THE THIRD CIRCUIT PRO-
COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM PREEMPTION 
HOLDING IN BELL SHOULD ULTIMATELY BE 
ADOPTED BY THE SUPREME COURT 
MATTHEW RENICK* 
Abstract: In Bell v. Cheswick Generating Station, the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit reversed a decision by the U.S. District Court for the Western 
District of Pennsylvania, holding that state common law tort actions were not 
preempted by the federal Clean Air Act (“CAA”). The Third Circuit found that 
the savings clause of the CAA was nearly identical to that of the Clean Water 
Act (“CWA”), which had already been found to not preempt state common law 
tort actions by the U.S. Supreme Court. This Comment argues that the Third 
Circuit correctly compared the savings clauses of the CAA and the CWA. Fur-
ther, it argues that the Supreme Court, with its history of allowing states to add 
to baseline federal safety legislation, would permit this action to stand. It then 
suggests that the Supreme Court should address the circuit split between the 
U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Third and Fourth Circuits on this issue, and pre-
dicts that the Court would come down on the side of the Third Circuit’s permis-
sive analysis. 
INTRODUCTION 
According to Scientific American, fly ash—a by-product of burning coal 
in power plants—carries 100 times more radiation than the waste from a 
similarly sized nuclear power plant.1 Fly ash can leach into the soil and water 
surrounding a coal-fired plant, which can affect crops, groundwater, and ulti-
mately food sources.2 Further, people living within a one-mile radius of a 
coal-fired plant are exposed to the potential of ingesting this radiation.3 Kris-
tie Bell, Joan Luppe, and the other plaintiffs in the class action case Bell v. 
Cheswick Generating Station realized the consequences of living near a coal-
fired power plant.4 Fly ash from the Cheswick Generating Station regularly 
                                                                                                                           
 * Matthew Renick, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW, 2014–2015. 
 1 Mara Hvistendahl, Coal Ash Is More Radioactive Than Nuclear Waste, SCIENTIFIC AM. (Dec. 
13, 2007), http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/coal-ash-is-more-radioactive-than-nuclear-
waste/, archived at http://perma.cc/752X-DC2P. 
 2 Id. 
 3 Id. 
 4 See Bell v. Cheswick Generating Station (Bell II), 734 F.3d 188, 189, 192 (3rd Cir. 2013). 
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settled on their properties, requiring constant cleaning and leaving them feel-
ing like “prisoners in their own homes.”5 
 “Coal-fired power plants produce more . . . hazardous air emissions than 
any other industrial pollution source.”6 These plants are responsible for 
386,000 tons of air pollutants every year, and contribute over forty percent of 
the mercury emissions in the United States.7 Despite this, coal has been the 
largest domestic source of electricity generation for over sixty years, and con-
stituted thirty-nine percent of domestic total net generation in 2013.8 
 The United States has “the largest estimated recoverable reserves of coal 
in the world,” and has enough coal to keep burning at current levels for 200 
years.9 In 1970, in response to the growth in the amount of air pollution in the 
United States, Congress adopted the Clean Air Act (“CAA”) “to protect the 
Nation’s air resources so as to promote the public health and welfare and the 
productive capacity of its population.”10 To achieve those goals, the CAA, as 
implemented by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), sets National 
Ambient Air Quality Standards (“NAAQS”) that limit the concentration of 
listed air pollutants to certain maximum amounts.11 NAAQS limitations ap-
ply to each state through state implementation plans and to certain electricity-
generating power stations,12 and they are enforced by EPA through air-permit 
programs.13 Each power plant is thus regulated at both the federal and state 
levels.14 
The Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution holds that federal law 
will be binding upon the laws of the states, and that federal law generally 
                                                                                                                           
 5 Id. at 192. 
 6 AM. LUNG ASS’N, TOXIC AIR: THE CASE FOR CLEANING UP COAL-FIRED POWER PLANTS 1 
(2011), available at http://www.lung.org/assets/documents/healthy-air/toxic-air-report.pdf. 
 7 Id. at 1–2. 
 8 Energy in Brief: What Is the Role of Coal in the United States?, U.S. ENERGY INFO. AD-
MIN., http://www.eia.gov/energy_in_brief/article/role_coal_us.cfm (last updated June 2, 2014), 
archived at http://perma.cc/U46X-A5R6. 
 9 Id. 
 10 Clean Air Act, Pub. L. No. 88-206, 77 Stat. 392 (1963) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 7401–7671 (2012)). 
 11 See 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b). 
 12 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(1), (2)(C); see 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(b) (2015). 
 13 See generally Air Quality Planning and Standards: Air Permit Programs, U.S. ENVTL. 
PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/airquality/permjmp.html (last updated Oct. 8, 2014), ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/ZQ57-VKFP (“The purpose of title V permits is to reduce violations of 
air pollution laws and improve enforcement of those laws.”). 
 14 Bell II, 734 F.3d 188, 190 (3rd Cir. 2013); see also Electric Power Generation, Transmis-
sion, and Distribution (NAICS 2211), U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www2.epa.gov/regulatory-
information-sector/electric-power-generation-transmission-and-distribution-naics-2211 (last up-
dated Feb. 12, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/D7ET-PVPH (listing applicable federal laws and 
providing a link to state law resources). 
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takes precedence over state law.15 The CAA attempted to resolve the issue of 
preemption by employing a “cooperative federalism” structure, under which 
the individual states, in adhering to the statute, build upon basic federal re-
quirements.16 As part of this idea, the CAA includes a citizen suit provision, 
within which there is a “savings clause.”17 
In April 2012, a group of approximately 1500 individuals residing near 
the Cheswick Generating Station (the “Plant”) filed a class action lawsuit in a 
Pennsylvania state court against the owners of the Plant (“GenOn” or the 
“Defendant”), “under several state law tort theories.”18 After removing the 
case to federal court, GenOn argued that because the plant is regulated under 
the CAA, it could not be sued under state tort law.19 After the district court 
dismissed the case,20 plaintiffs appeals to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit.21 Upon review, the Third Circuit reversed and remanded the 
case, holding that the CAA does not preempt state common law tort actions.22 
This Comment argues that the Third Circuit correctly interpreted the 
savings clause of the citizen suit provision of the CAA as allowing source 
state common law tort claims.23 The court’s careful textual comparison of the 
savings clause provision of the CAA and of the Clean Water Act (“CWA”) 
revealed virtually identical language and purpose in the statutes.24 Because 
the U.S. Supreme Court had already ruled that the savings clause of the CWA 
does not preempt source state tort law claims, the Third Circuit correctly ap-
plied that ruling to its analysis in this case.25 Furthermore, the Supreme Court 
has a history of allowing states to build upon federal safety legislation.26 This 
Comment thus argues that the Court should resolve the circuit split on this 
issue between the Third Circuit and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit by applying the Third Circuit’s reasoning in Bell.27 
                                                                                                                           
 15 U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2; see Supremacy Clause, LEGAL INFO. INST., http://www.law.
cornell.edu/wex/supremacy_clause (last visited Mar. 23, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/9ABS-
DWCS. When federal law conflicts with state law, it “displaces, or preempts, state law.” Preemp-
tion, LEGAL INFO. INST., http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/preemption (last visited Mar. 23, 2015), 
archived at http://perma.cc/8EGJ-KG44. 
 16 See Bell II, 734 F.3d at 190. 
 17 Id. at 191. 
 18 Id. at 189 n.1. 
 19 Id. at 189. 
 20 Id. 
 21 Id. at 190. 
 22 Id. 
 23 See infra notes 97–132 and accompanying text. 
 24 See Bell II, 734 F.3d at 196. 
 25 See id.; infra notes 100–106 and accompanying text. 
 26 See infra notes 113–122 and accompanying text. 
 27 See infra notes 113–132 and accompanying text; see also Samantha Caravello, Bell v. 
Cheswick Generating Station, Comment, 38 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 465, 471 (2014) (noting the 
circuit split). 
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I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Owned and operated by GenOn, the Cheswick Generating Station is a 
570-megawatt coal-fired electrical generation facility located in Springdale, 
Pennsylvania.28 Kristie Bell and Joan Luppe represented the Plaintiff class 
(“Plaintiffs” or the “Class”), which included more than 1500 individuals who 
owned or inhabited residential property within one mile of the Plant.29 
On April 19, 2012, Plaintiffs commenced the action against GenOn in 
the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, Pennsylvania.30 Plaintiffs 
alleged that GenOn’s “operation, maintenance, control[,] and use” of the 
Plant caused damage to their properties and resulted in their inhalation of 
odors and in the deposit of coal dust and fly ash on their properties.31 They 
also claimed that the “atmospheric emissions” produced by the Plant “[fell] 
upon their properties” and remained either as “black dust” or “white powder,” 
precluding the full use and enjoyment of their homes.32 Plaintiffs then alleged 
that GenOn was notified of their complaints, and yet did nothing to resolve 
the issue.33 Further, they alleged that GenOn “knew of or allowed the im-
proper construction and operation of the [Plant] and that [it] continues to op-
erate the . . . [P]lant without proper or best available technology or any proper 
air pollution control equipment . . . .”34 The class sought to recover “compen-
satory and punitive damages under four . . . common law tort theories: (I) 
nuisance; (II) negligence and recklessness; (III) trespass; and (IV) strict liabil-
ity.”35 
GenOn removed the case to the U.S. District Court for the Western Dis-
trict of Pennsylvania based on diversity of citizenship, and moved to dismiss 
the action on the grounds that the CAA preempted the Plaintiff’s state law tort 
claims.36 In October 2012, the district court dismissed the case.37 The court 
reasoned that the CAA preempted all of the Class’s state law claims because, 
“[b]ased on the extensive and comprehensive regulations promulgated by the 
administrative bodies which govern air emissions from electrical generation 
facilities, . . . to permit the common law claims would be inconsistent with 
                                                                                                                           
 28 Bell v. Cheswick Generating Station (Bell I), 903 F. Supp. 2d 314, 314–15 (D. Pa. 2012), 
rev’d, 734 F.3d 188 (3rd Cir. 2013). 
 29 Id. at 315. 
 30 Id. at 314–15. 
 31 Id. 
 32 They were constantly cleaning and considered themselves “prisoners in their . . . own . . . 
homes.” Id. 
 33 Id. 
 34 Id. 
 35 Id. at 315–16. 
 36 Bell II, 734 F.3d 188, 193 (3rd Cir. 2013). 
 37 Id. 
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the dictates of the [CAA].”38 The district court summarized the “extensive 
regulatory framework governing the Plant” and its operation.39 It then exam-
ined whether the CAA preempted the state law tort claims, or whether the 
savings clause in the citizen suit provision allowed the claims to survive.40 It 
determined that due to the regulations promulgated by pursuant to the CAA, 
permitting the state law claims would be “inconsistent with the [statute’s] 
dictates . . . .”41 
In 2013, the Class appealed to the Third Circuit.42 The Third Circuit re-
versed the ruling of the district court, holding that “source state common law 
actions are not preempted” by the CAA.43 The court determined that, accord-
ing to a plain language reading of the statute, as well as the controlling Su-
preme Court precedent, the savings clause protected such state tort actions.44 
Additionally, the court compared the CAA’s savings clause to the CWA’s sav-
ings clause, and found no definitive differences between the two.45 
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
The Supremacy Clause of Article VI of the U.S. Constitution states that 
federal law “shall be the supreme Law of the Land.”46 The Supreme Court 
interprets the function of the Supremacy Clause as a preemption of any state 
law that “interferes with or is contrary to federal law . . . .”47 The U.S Court 
of Appeals for the Third Circuit has held that preemption can occur in one of 
three ways: (1) express preemption, (2) field preemption, and (3) conflict 
preemption.48 
Express preemption occurs when Congress expresses “an explicit state-
ment of intent to preempt state or local law and sets forth the scope of that 
preemption . . . .”49 Field and conflict preemption—which fall under the larg-
er category of “implied preemption”—occur in instances where Congress’s 
intent to preempt “is not clearly stated.”50 Field preemption can be inferred 
when “[t]he scheme of federal regulation may be so pervasive as to make rea-
                                                                                                                           
 38 Id. (quoting Bell I, 903 F. Supp. 2d at 322). 
 39 Id. 
 40 See Bell I, 903 F. Supp. 2d at 321–23. 
 41 Bell II, 734 F.3d at 193. 
 42 Id. 
 43 Id. at 190. 
 44 Id. 
 45 Id. at 194–97. 
 46 U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2. 
 47 Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663, 666 (1962). 
 48 Farina v. Nokia, Inc., 625 F.3d 97, 115 (3rd Cir 2010). 
 49 Alan Untereiner, The Defense of Preemption: A View from the Trenches, 84 TUL. L. REV. 
1257, 1259 (2010). 
 50 Id. 
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sonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement 
it.51 Alternatively, field preemption will be implied when an “[a]ct of Con-
gress . . . touch[es] a field in which the federal interest is so dominant that the 
federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the 
same subject.”52 Finally, conflict preemption nullifies state law when it con-
flicts with federal law, either when it is impossible to comply with both laws 
or when state law blocks full execution of the federal law.53 
According to the U.S. Supreme Court, there are “two cornerstones of . . . 
pre-emption jurisprudence” that must guide a preemption analysis.54 First, 
“the purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone in every pre-emption 
case.”55 Second, when “Congress has ‘legislated . . . in a field which the 
States have traditionally occupied,’ . . . [there is an] assumption that the his-
toric police powers of the State were not to be superseded by the Federal 
Act,” unless it was made clear by Congress.56 Preemption analysis thus seeks 
to prevent states from disturbing the regulatory balance “set by a federal 
agency or Congress.”57 
The Clean Air Act (“CAA”) employs “cooperative federalism,” meaning 
that it “authorizes the Environmental Protection Agency (the “EPA”) to estab-
lish air quality standards and empowers the states to achieve those stand-
ards.”58 The CAA promotes further federal-state interactions by requiring 
states to implement national ambient air quality standards (“NAAQS”) 
through individualized state implementation plans (“SIPs”).59 The CAA then 
requires states to submit the SIPs to the EPA for approval.60 
In the spirit of cooperative federalism, the CAA allows for states to im-
plement additional requirements and enforcement mechanisms for air quality 
regulations.61 The CAA also “contains savings clauses that preserve certain 
causes of action notwithstanding the comprehensive federal regulatory 
scheme.”62 These savings clauses include a provision that aims to preserve 
states’ rights.63 One such clause, in section 116, states, “nothing . . . shall pre-
clude or deny the right of any state or political subdivision thereof to adopt or 
enforce . . . any standard or limitation respecting emissions of air pollutants 
                                                                                                                           
 51 Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 231 (1946). 
 52 Id. 
 53 Farina, 625 F.3d at 115. 
 54 Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 565 (2009). 
 55 Id. (citing Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996)). 
 56 Id. (citing Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 485). 
 57 Caravello, supra note 27, at 466. 
 58 GenOn REMA, LLC v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 722 F.3d 513, 516 (3rd Cir. 2013). 
 59 Id. 
 60 Id. 
 61 Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7416 (2012). 
 62 Caravello, supra note 27, at 467. 
 63 See 42 U.S.C. § 7416. 
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. . . .”64 Accordingly, the CAA establishes only minimum air quality levels 
and leaves the states “free to adopt more stringent protections.”65 
Although the Supreme Court has never ruled on the convergence of state 
common law tort claims and the savings clause in the context of the CAA, it 
did address the analogous clause in the Clean Water Act (“CWA”).66 In Inter-
national Paper Co. v. Ouellette, the Court held that the CWA savings clause 
preserves state actions that are compatible with the Act, and therefore “noth-
ing in the Act bars aggrieved individuals from bringing a nuisance claim pur-
suant to the law of the source State.”67 The CWA allows states to “impose 
higher standards on their own point sources,” thus allowing states to “adopt 
more stringent limitations . . . through state nuisance law, and apply them to 
in-state dischargers.”68 The Ouellette Court further stated that, “application of 
the source [s]tate’s law does not disturb the balance among federal . . . and 
affected-state interests.”69 Ouellette restricts the application of state law to the 
source state, and holds that only applying another state’s law to the source 
state would be preempted by the CWA.70 
The Supreme Court has stated that the citizen suit savings clause of the 
CWA is “virtually identical” to its counterpart in the CAA.71 Furthermore, 
Ouellette has been relied on by both the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Sixth 
and Fourth Circuits to support similar contentions with respect to the CAA’s 
savings clause.72 In Her Majesty the Queen in Right of the Province of Ontar-
io v. City of Detroit, the Sixth Circuit held that the CAA did not preempt the 
state law claims under the Michigan Environmental Protection Act.73 The 
court held that the CAA takes precedence over state law only when the state 
law does not meet the federally mandated minimum requirements.74 
The Fourth Circuit cited to Ouellette in North Carolina, ex rel. Cooper v. 
Tennessee Valley Authority, in which it found that the CAA’s savings clause 
                                                                                                                           
 64 Id. 
 65 Her Majesty the Queen in Right of the Province of Ontario v. City of Detroit, 874 F.2d 332, 
336 (6th Cir. 1989). 
 66 See Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1151 (2012); Int’l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 
500 (1987). 
 67 479 U.S. at 497. 
 68 Id. (quoting City of Milwaukee v. Illinois & Michigan, 451 U.S. 304, 328 (1981)). 
 69 Id. at 498–99. 
 70 Id. at 496, 499. 
 71 See City of Milwaukee, 451 U.S. at 328; see also 33 U.S.C. § 1251(g) (“It is the policy of 
Congress that the authority of each State to allocate quantities of water within its jurisdiction shall 
not be superseded, abrogated[,] or otherwise impaired by this chapter.”). 
 72 See North Carolina ex rel. Cooper v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 615 F.3d 291, 304 (4th Cir. 2010) 
(citing Ouellette, 479 U.S at 494); Her Majesty the Queen in Right of the Province of Ontario v. 
City of Detroit, 874 F.2d 332, 343 (6th Cir. 1989). 
 73 Her Majesty the Queen, 874 F.2d at 334. 
 74 Id. at 342. 
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and the CWA’s savings clause were “similar.”75 The Fourth Circuit reviewed 
a district court injunction that ordered the Tennessee Valley Authority 
(“TVA”) to immediately install emission controls at four power plants in Ala-
bama and Tennessee.76 A nuisance suit had been brought by the state of North 
Carolina, claiming its air quality had been degraded as a result of the TVA 
plants’ emissions.77 The Fourth Circuit overturned the district court decision 
and dissolved the injunction, holding that the CAA preempted North Carolina 
from bringing the suit.78 The court held that the district court had erroneously 
applied the law of the affected state to the source state.79 In so holding, the 
Fourth Circuit found that TVA had complied with the laws of the source state, 
and reasoned that, per Ouellette, the suit would have been allowed had TVA 
violated the law of the source state.80 
The Supreme Court has addressed the state common law tort preemption 
question, but not in cases concerning the CAA or the CWA.81 In Freightliner 
Corp. v. Myrick, the Court held that a Georgia state common law tort claim 
was not preempted by the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act 
(“NTMVSA”).82 In this case, the plaintiffs brought a common law action al-
leging negligent design defects in equipment—specifically brakes—manufac-
tured by the defendants.83 The estates of the decedent plaintiffs argued that 
the lack of ABS brakes on two 18-wheel trucks caused the plaintiffs’ deaths.84 
The Supreme Court noted that the NTMVSA contained a savings clause stat-
ing that compliance with the Act would not exempt a person from common 
law liability.85 The Court thus held that Georgia was free to establish or con-
tinue its own safety standards in addition to the NTMVSA, provided that it 
was still possible to comply with both the federal and state laws.86 The Court 
further held that the NTMVSA did not explicitly or implicitly preempt the 
state common law claims asserted.87 
In Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, the Supreme Court held that the Feder-
al Boat Safety Act (“FBSA”) did not preempt the plaintiff from bringing an 
Illinois state common law tort action, because the FBSA’s savings clause did 
                                                                                                                           
 75 615 F.3d at 304 (citing Ouellette, 479 U.S at 494). 
 76 Id. at 296. 
 77 See id. 
 78 Id. 
 79 Id. 
 80 See id. 
 81 See Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 54 (2002); Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 
U.S. 280, 282 (1995). 
 82 514 U.S. at 283. 
 83 Id. at 282–83. 
 84 Id. 
 85 Id. at 284. 
 86 Id. at 286. 
 87 Id. at 286–87. 
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not relieve a person from liability under state law.88 In this case, the plaintiff’s 
wife was killed in a boating accident when a propeller manufactured by the 
defendant struck her.89 The Supreme Court held that the FBSA’s express 
preemption clause did not extend to the plaintiff’s common law claims, and 
that Act’s statutory scheme did not implicitly preempt the plaintiff’s claims.90 
The Court further held that the Coast Guard’s decision not to regulate propel-
ler guards did not preempt the plaintiff’s claim because that decision was 
simply preserving the power of the states to choose to regulate propeller 
guards.91 
Although the Supreme Court displayed consistency in Sprietsma and 
Freightliner, it has held differently on this same issue in the past.92 In Geier v. 
American Honda Motor Co., Inc., the Court held that the Federal Motor Ve-
hicle Safety Standard (“FMVSS”) preempted a state common law tort 
claim.93 In this case, the plaintiff, while driving an automobile not equipped 
with passive restraints, was seriously injured during a crash.94 The plaintiff 
sued under District of Columbia tort law alleging negligence.95 The Supreme 
Court ruled that this was an example of conflict preemption, as the claim was 
in direct conflict with FMVSS.96 
III. ANALYSIS 
In Bell v. Cheswick Generating Station, the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit overturned the ruling of the U.S. District Court for the West-
ern District of Pennsylvania.97 The Third Circuit held that the Clean Air Act 
(“CAA”) did not preempt the plaintiff’s state common law tort claims, focus-
ing its analysis on the similarities of the language between the Clean Water 
Act’s (“CWA”) savings clause and the CAA’s savings clause.98 The court de-
termined that the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in International Paper Co. v. 
Ouellette controlled because the pollution was based, and the lawsuit was 
brought, in a single source state.99 
In Bell, the Third Circuit held that the Supreme Court’s reasoning in 
Ouellette with respect to the CWA should apply to the CAA savings clause at 
                                                                                                                           
 88 Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 63 (2002). 
 89 Id. at 54. 
 90 Id. at 62–64. 
 91 See id. at 64–65. 
 92 See Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., 529 U.S. 861, 865 (2000). 
 93 Id. 
 94 Id. 
 95 Id. 
 96 Id. at 872; see supra note 53 and accompanying text (defining conflict preemption). 
 97 734 F.3d 188, 190 (3rd Cir. 2013). 
 98 Id. at 196–97. 
 99 Id.; see Int’l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 500 (1987). 
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issue.100 The court reasoned that although Ouellette dealt with the CWA spe-
cifically, the text of the CWA savings clause and that of the CAA savings 
clause revealed, “there is no meaningful difference between them.”101 The 
court explained that the only meaningful difference between the two savings 
clauses was the CWA’s reference to the boundary waters of states.102 It none-
theless concluded that this omission from the CAA does not “preempt all 
state law tort claims.”103 The court then cited other cases—including Her 
Majesty the Queen in Right of the Province of Ontario v. City of Detroit and 
North Carolina, ex rel. Cooper v. Tennessee Valley Authority—that evince 
strong similarities between the CAA and CWA.104 
Citing Her Majesty the Queen and Cooper, the Third Circuit concluded 
that the Supreme Court’s decision in Ouellette had adequately addressed 
GenOn’s public policy concerns.105 Further, the court rejected GenOn’s claim 
that the lawsuit should be barred by the political question doctrine, stating “no 
court has ever held that such a constitutional commitment of authority regard-
ing the redress of individual property rights for pollution exists in the legisla-
tive branch.”106 
Although the question of preemption of state common law by the CAA 
presented an issue of first impression for the Third Circuit, it has been previ-
ously examined in the Fourth Circuit, which reached a different result.107 No-
tably, in Cooper the Fourth Circuit held that the CAA preempted the nuisance 
action brought by the plaintiffs.108 The Fourth Circuit stated that allowing 
North Carolina to impose its own laws on power plants already regulated by 
the CAA would lead to differing rules all over the country and uncertainty 
regarding industry regulations.109 The Fourth Circuit’s consideration of Ouel-
lette, however, was incompatible with the Third Circuit’s analysis in Bell.110 
The Fourth Circuit cited Ouellette to highlight its conclusion that having dif-
                                                                                                                           
 100 Bell, 734 F.3d at 196–97; see Ouellette, 479 U.S. at 498–99. 
 101 Bell, 734 F.3d at 195; see Ouellette, 479 U.S. at 498–99. 
 102 This, the Court noted, is not applicable to the CAA (as there are no jurisdictional bounda-
ries between states in the air), and as such the two savings clauses are essentially the same. Bell, 
734 F.3d at 195; see Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(e) (2012). 
 103 Bell, 734 F.3d at 195. 
 104 See id. at 196 (citing North Carolina ex rel. Cooper v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 615 F.3d 291, 
304 (4th Cir. 2010), and Her Majesty the Queen in Right of the Province of Ontario v. City of 
Detroit, 874 F.2d 332, 336 (6th Cir. 1989)). 
 105 Id. at 197. Ouellette held that state nuisance actions do not frustrate the CWA, both be-
cause the Act explicitly allows source states to impose stricter standards, and because operators 
need only know the law of the state in which it is operating. See 479 U.S. at 498–99. 
 106 Bell, 734 F.3d at 198. 
 107 Caravello, supra note 27, at 471. 
 108 615 F.3d 291, 296 (4th Cir. 2010); see Nigel Barrella, Comment, North Carolina v. Ten-
nessee Valley Authority, 35 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 247, 247–48 (2011). 
 109 See Cooper, 615 F.3d at 301. 
 110 See id.; Caravello, supra note 27, at 471–72. 
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ferent laws in different states controlling a single plant would create “chaotic 
confrontation” between them.111 Further, it held that state common law tort 
claims are not the correct vehicle for resolution of environmental disputes, 
and stated that the clearly defined standards of the CAA should take prece-
dence over an “ill-defined omnibus tort of last resort.”112 
Although the Supreme Court denied certiorari in both Bell and Cooper, 
its precedent suggests that it would likely agree with the Third Circuit’s 
preemption analysis.113 The holding in Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick—that a 
Georgia state common law remedy was not preempted by a federal stat-
ute114—closely mirrors the reasoning in Bell.115 Both cases begin with the 
framework of a state common law tort claim facing possible preemption by a 
far-reaching federal statute.116 Furthermore, both courts employed a liberal 
reading of the savings clauses found in the two statutes, thus enabling state 
common law tort claims to move forward.117 Finally, both courts appear to 
agree with the assumption that federal statutes only preempt state common 
law where it is clear that they do so, and are thus unlikely to find implied 
preemption in these types of statutes.118 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine contin-
ued with this line of reasoning by holding that the Federal Boat Safety Act 
(“FBSA”) did not preempt an Illinois state common law tort action.119 Much 
like its decision in Freightliner, the Court held that the FBSA’s savings clause 
did not relieve a person of liability under state law.120 The Court cited the 
FBSA’s savings clause, which is very similar to both the CAA’s and the 
NTMVSA’s savings clauses.121 Both Freightliner and Sprietsma suggest that 
the Supreme Court, much like the Third Circuit in Bell, maintains a more re-
strictive notion of federal preemption that leaves the states significant leeway 
to add laws that build on the federal floor.122 
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Although the Supreme Court came out on the other side of the preemp-
tion issue in Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc., the facts of Bell are 
readily distinguishable.123 The Geier Court found actual preemption, as the 
state common law tort claim was in direct conflict with the federal statute.124 
The opinion was careful, however, to preserve the savings clause in the stat-
ute at issue, stating that preemption can only be found after reading the statute 
narrowly to avoid restricting state common law rights.125 The Court, despite 
finding that the lawsuit was preempted, was clear in its affirmation of the 
preemption principles found in Freightliner and Sprietsma.126 The common 
law claim in Bell does not directly conflict with the CAA, and as such, it is 
likely the Supreme Court would not find conflict preemption.127 As the Court 
stated in Geier, “[t]his Court traditionally distinguishes between ‘express’ and 
‘implied’ pre-emptive intent.”128 
In light of Freightliner and Sprietsma, which were both decided by a 
majority of the current Court, it seems likely that the Third Circuit’s Bell 
analysis would prove more persuasive than the Fourth Circuit’s Cooper anal-
ysis.129 Even though the statutes at issue in both Supreme Court cases are 
broad reaching, the Court appears loath to cut the states out of the regulatory 
equation.130 Further, the Court has clearly deferred to the states in cases 
where the federal act has a pronounced savings clause.131 These holdings thus 
suggest that the current Supreme Court would embrace the Third Circuit’s 
analysis in Bell and extend its reading of Ouellette, upholding state common 
law tort claims.132 
CONCLUSION 
In Bell v. Cheswick Generating Station, the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit held that the Clean Air Act does not preempt state common 
law tort claims against power plant polluters. By recognizing the history of 
constitutional preemption and Congress’s intent in crafting the Clean Air 
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Act’s savings clause, the court provided a remedy for citizens to bring an ac-
tion against an industry that is broadly regulated by the federal government. 
The decision in Bell is a victory for individuals affected by pollution. No 
longer, in the Third Circuit, are power stations able to operate only according 
to federal minimums. Because the Fourth Circuit takes a different approach, 
however, it is likely the Supreme Court will need to address this circuit split 
in the near future. If and when that happens, the Supreme Court should, and 
likely will, adopt the Third Circuit’s reasoning and establish a standard con-
sistent with its extensive precedent on state common law rights: to preserve 
the ability of states to build upon the federal floor established by the Clean 
Air Act, and thus add their own robust measures to environmental laws. 
